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Note
THE CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE CODE AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AILLA WASSTROM-WELZ
Connecticut enacted its first formal evidence code in 2000. Initially,
the rules set forth in the evidence code were understood as binding and not
subject to appellate court revision. However, in State v. DeJesus, a 2008
Connecticut Supreme Court decision, the court held otherwise. The
DeJesus court interpreted the plain language and history of the code as not
intending to bind the appellate courts. The plurality went on, in dicta, to
conclude that such a holding was necessary to preserve the
constitutionality of the code. The plurality asserted that the superior court
judges, in their rulemaking capacity as delegated to them by the
legislature, lack the constitutional authority to bind the appellate courts to
such a code. This decision is one of several in a line of Connecticut cases
raising the question of the extent to which the legislative and judicial
branches exert control over state judicial procedure. This Note discusses
the four opinions issued in State v. DeJesus and examines the ongoing
constitutional questions surrounding the separation of powers between
these branches and the newly raised question as to the separation of
powers within the judicial branch itself.
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THE CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE CODE AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AILLA WASSTROM-WELZ*
It is one of the great legacies of the framers of our Federal
Constitution . . . that the three branches of government must be separate
and independent of one another. But, what will be the instruments of
justice? The court structure; their jurisdiction; the number of judges; the
sizes of the court houses; the selection of judges; the nature and number of
Judicial Department personnel—the responsibility for all these decisions is
reposed by our Constitution and the peoples’ elected representatives—the
Governor and the General Assembly. This is as it should be, for like the
other two branches of Government, the Judicial branch exists solely to
serve the people . . . . By its very nature . . . it is to a far greater degree
than the other two branches, cloaked in an aura of majesty and mystery to
the average citizen’s eye. Yet, the Judicial branch exists but to serve the
needs of the people and to that end it is incumbunt [sic] upon the peoples’
elected representatives to periodically examine the machinery of justice to
determine if the people are being served as effectively, as efficiently, as
intelligently and compassionately as they have a right to expect of their
Judicial branch.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike most state courts, Connecticut courts did not have a formalized
evidence code until 2000. With the advent of the Connecticut Evidence
Code (the “Evidence Code” or the “Code”), it was thought that all
Connecticut courts were bound by these rules, allowing common law
changes only when the Code was ambiguous or silent on a particular issue.
In 2008, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that Connecticut
appellate courts were not intended to be bound by the Code. The court
interpreted the Evidence Code’s stated purpose—“to promote the growth
and development of [evidence law] through interpretation of the Code and
through judicial rule making”—as ambiguous, and so turned to the Code’s
*
Saint Michael’s College, B.A. 2003; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate
2010. I would like to thank Professor Richard Kay for his thoughtful comments and guidance
throughout the writing process. I also wish to thank my colleagues at Connecticut Law Review for their
hard work and insight. This Note is dedicated to my mother, Susan Wasstrom, whose endless support,
encouragement, and pursuit of justice led me to the study of law.
1
Connecticut Commission to Study and Draft Legislation for the Reorganization and Unification
of the Courts: Hearing Before the Commission to Study the Reorganization and Unification of the
Courts 100–01 (1973) (statement of Peter Cashman, Lieutenant Governor, Connecticut).
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history to reach their decision. This history persuaded the court that the
Evidence Code did not divest the appellate courts of the common law
power to make evidence rules. The court went on to conclude that such an
interpretation was necessary to avoid any constitutional impediments.
Part II of this Note examines the history of the Connecticut Evidence
Code—the drafting process, promulgation, and initial judicial dicta on its
binding quality. Part III provides a detailed statement of the reasoning of
the plurality opinion in State v. DeJesus,3 as well as the two concurring
opinions and the sole dissenting opinion. Part IV focuses on the
constitutional questions raised in the various opinions—specifically, the
proposition that the essential functions of the constitutional courts were
frozen in 1818. Finally, Part V discusses the effects of DeJesus and
possible legislative responses.
II. HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT’S CODE OF EVIDENCE
A. The Drafting and Approval of a Code of Evidence
In 1999, the judges of the Connecticut Superior Court adopted a formal
evidence code to be effective in 2000.4 Prior to the Code’s adoption,
practitioners, judges, and parties relied on the common law, statutes, and
an informal non-authoritative handbook to determine the rules of evidence.
“The rationale for having a Code of Evidence [was] that it [would] be
easier and more efficient for all of the relevant actors in the litigation
process . . . to have a code, stated in concise and familiar ‘black letter’
form, to which to refer.”5
In her 1984 biennial report, Connecticut Supreme Court Chief Justice
Ellen Peters suggested that the General Assembly draft and enact a formal
code of evidence.6 Seven years later, the co-chair of the legislative
Judiciary Committee initiated the code drafting process by asking the Law
Revision Commission to research and draft a code of evidence.7 A
committee, consisting of attorneys, judges, and legislators, met monthly for
four years to draft the Code.8
2

State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 62 (Conn. 2008) (quoting CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2 (2008)).
953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
4
CONN. CODE EVID. foreword (2008).
5
Justice David M. Borden, The New Code of Evidence: A (Very) Brief Introduction and
Overview, 73 CONN. B.J. 210, 212 (1999).
6
COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE 6 (4th
ed. 2008). After the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975, several states followed and
adopted their own procedural codes similar in form. By 2000, when Connecticut adopted its first
evidence code, forty-one states had adopted rules of evidence “patterned on the Federal Rules.” JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 6 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2009).
7
TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 6.
8
The initial committee of the Law Revision Commission consisted of the following members:
3
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The committee codified the existing evidence law rather than
reforming it.9 In the few instances where Connecticut common law was
silent, prevailing nationwide evidence law was used to fill the gaps.10
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence were loosely consistent with
Connecticut common law, the committee decided against the wholesale
adoption of the federal rules because the number of Connecticut lawyers
practicing in federal courts did not justify “requir[ing] the bench and bar to
learn a whole new evidentiary vocabulary.”11
The committee also chose not to incorporate the many evidence rules
from the Connecticut General Statutes into the Code.12 These statutes were
deemed “incomplete” and “inconsistent,” thus requiring substantive reform
beyond the scope of the initial rules promulgation.13 Also, “the committee
had no confidence that it could find all such statutes and to purport that it
had done so would be inaccurate and misleading.”14 Later, the Code’s
drafting was transferred from the legislature to the judiciary, making this
consideration irrelevant, as the courts cannot change statutes.15
The committee submitted the draft for public hearing, revisions were
made, and the final draft of the Code and commentary was sent to the Law
Revision Commission. The Commission adopted the Code, without
further revisions, and sent it to the General Assembly for final approval in
1997.16 The draft, however, never reached the floor of the General
Assembly. Instead, on March 3, 1998, the co-chairs of the Judiciary
Committee sent a letter to then Chief Justice Callahan requesting that the
judicial branch, not the legislature, publish the Code as rules of court,
Professor Chair: Connecticut Supreme Court Justice David M. Borden; Professor Colin C. Tait,
University of Connecticut School of Law; Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Joette Katz; Connecticut
Superior Court Judges Julia L. Aurigemma, Samuel Freed, and Joseph Q. Koletsky; Attorneys Robert
Adelman, Jeffrey Apuzzo, Joseph Bruckman, William Dow III, David Elliot, Susann E. Gill, Donald
Holtman, Houston Lowry, Jane Scholl, and Eric Wiechmann; Attorney Rick Taff, Legislative
Commissioner’s Office; Representative Arthur O’Neill and Judge Elliot Solomon, Law Revision
Commission; Senator Thomas Upson; and Attorneys Jon FitzGerald, Eric Levine, and Jo Roberts, Law
Revision Commission. Borden, supra note 5, at 210–11.
9
TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 7.
10
Borden, supra note 5, at 213–14. For example, there existed no rule at Connecticut common
law resolving the issue of whether preliminary factual determinations regarding the admissibility of
evidence are subject to the rules of evidence. The Commission turned to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and other learned evidence sources to find and apply the
“generally . . . prevailing view.” CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-1 cmt., at 2 (2008).
11
Borden, supra note 5, at 214.
12
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (2009) (stating the rules for the admissibility of business
records); Id. § 52-146b (2009) (explaining that communications to clergymen are privileged and cannot
be disclosed in civil or criminal cases); Id. § 52-180a (2009) (stating the rules for the admissibility of
out of state hospital records); Id. § 52-184a (2009) (stating the rules for the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained by electronic device).
13
TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 7.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 7–8.
16
Id. at 8.
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similar to the rules of practice. The co-chairs proposed that the Code be
adopted pursuant to the rulemaking authority of the judiciary. The letter
explained that judicial control was best, as it would isolate the Code from
politically-motivated rule changes, be “responsive to judicial concerns,”
and simplify the amendment process by removing the more timeconsuming restraints of the legislative process.18
Following this request, Chief Justice Callahan appointed a committee
to draft and publish a judicial code of evidence.19 This committee made
minor changes to the legislative committee’s draft and the Code was sent
to the Rules Committee of the Connecticut Superior Court where it was
unanimously approved. A public hearing was held, followed by a vote of
the Connecticut Superior Court judges, who unanimously approved the
Code on June 28, 1999, to be effective January 1, 2000. The judges of the
superior court formally adopted the commentary to the Code as well. The
case law cited in the commentary clarifies the meaning of the rules;
consequently, the Code cannot be understood properly without the
commentary.20
B. State v. Sawyer: The Code in Question—Final and Binding?
In State v. Sawyer, the defendant was charged and found guilty in the
superior court on all counts of sexual assault.21 The State submitted
evidence of the defendant’s past uncharged sexual misconduct and argued
that the evidence was admissible under the common plan or scheme and
identity exceptions to the character evidence bar22 in section 4-5 of the
Evidence Code which reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is
inadmissible to prove the bad character or criminal
tendencies of that person. . . . Evidence of other crimes,
17

Id. at 8; Borden, supra note 5, at 211.
See TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 8–9 (“We . . . believe that the code would more
appropriately be promulgated as rules of court rather than as legislation of the Connecticut General
Assembly. The code reflects existing court-made law and must, in the future, remain responsive to
judicial concerns. We are, therefore, submitting the proposed code for consideration and possible
adoption by the Judicial Department.”); Borden, supra note 5, at 211.
19
The committee consisted of Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Joette Katz (Chair);
Connecticut Appellate Judge Barry R. Schaller; Connecticut Superior Court Judges Thomas A. Bishop,
Thomas J. Corradino, Samuel Freed, John Kavanewsky, Jr., Joseph Koletsky, and William B. Rush;
Professor Colin C. Tait; and Attorney Eric Levine. See TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 9–10;
Borden, supra note 5, at 211.
20
Borden, supra note 5, at 211–13.
21
State v. Sawyer, 904 A.2d 101, 104 (Conn. 2006), overruled by State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45,
68 (Conn. 2008). In Sawyer, the defendant was charged with violating Connecticut General Statutes
sections 53a-70(a)(1) (sexual assault in the first degree); 53a-72(a)(1)(A)–(B) (sexual assault in the
third degree); 52a-62(a)(1) (threatening); 53a-63(a) (reckless endangerment); and 53a-101(a)(1)
(burglary in the first degree). Id. at 105.
22
Id. at 106.
18
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wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other
than those specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent,
identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of
mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal
activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial
prosecution testimony.23
Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the evidence. It
found the exception applicable in light of the similarly situated victims.24
The appellate court affirmed,25 but the Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the similarities between the cases were insufficient
to show identity because they did not adequately demonstrate a signature
crime.26
Most relevant to this Note is the first footnote of Sawyer, which
precedes even the opening sentence of the decision. Following oral
argument, the supreme court requested supplemental briefings and
arguments from the parties on two issues: first, whether the court should
liberalize the standard for admitting prior evidence of sexual misconduct;
and second, whether the supreme court would be allowed to do so under
the Evidence Code.27 Writing for the majority, Justice Zarella asserted that
the first issue should not be decided on the basis of ripeness as the facts
presented did not warrant a change to the admissibility standard.28 The
majority did not stop there, but went on to comment that while the superior
court judges, through their rulemaking function, were the proper body to
change the rules of evidence, the supreme court had a historic common law
power to resolve substantive evidentiary questions. Specifically, Justice
Zarella asserted:
To the extent that our evidentiary rules may be deemed to
implicate substantive rights, we believe that it is unclear
whether those rules properly are the subject of judicial rule
making rather than the subject of common-law adjudication.
Because that question raises an issue on which we did not
request briefing by the parties, however, we leave it for
23

CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-5(a)–(b) (2008).
Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 106.
Id. at 109.
26
Id. at 111, 113.
27
See id. at 104 n.1 (“(1) ‘Should this court determine that, in sexual assault cases, prior
misconduct evidence admitted under the common scheme exception is also admissible to prove the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the assault on the victim?’ (2) ‘Should this court
reconsider its holdings that, in sexual assault cases, prior sexual misconduct is viewed more liberally
than other types of prior misconduct?’ (3) ‘To what extent, if any, is this court constrained by the Code
of Evidence from answering either question 1 or 2 by changing our existing law?’” (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
28
Id. at 104.
24
25
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another day.

This statement opened the door for what was later to come in State v.
DeJesus.30
In her concurring opinion, Justice Katz strongly objected to delaying
the response to the second issue—what constraint, if any, does the
Evidence Code exert upon the supreme court? Justice Katz concluded that
the supreme court is constrained by the Code and therefore cannot change
the rules of evidence through common law adjudication.31 In her words,
“The Code governs where it speaks, and the courts’ common-law rulemaking authority [only] governs either where the Code does not speak or
where the Code requires interpretation.”32
Justice Katz, in contrast to Justice Zarella, asserted that the evidence
rules in the Code are procedural.33 She agreed that, where a rule of
evidence is constitutionally challenged and substantive rights are at issue,
the supreme court retains its authority to review the rule for
constitutionality, just as in cases involving statutes or Practice Book
rules.34
Justice Borden, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also asserted
that the supreme court was constrained by the Evidence Code. Justice
Borden concluded that the supreme court is limited to applying the black
letter law of the Code and interpreting the Code when it is ambiguous.35
To support this position, he cited the language of the Code itself. Section
1-2(a) of the Code states:
The purposes of the Code are to adopt Connecticut case law
regarding rules of evidence as rules of court and to promote
the growth and development of the law of evidence through
interpretation of the Code and through judicial rule making to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.36
Justice Borden also cited the commentary to the Code, which as previously
noted, must be read in conjunction with the Code. The commentary to
29

Id.
953 A.2d 45, 68–69 (Conn. 2008); see also infra Part III.
31
Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 120 (Katz, J., concurring).
32
Id. at 121.
33
Id. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Katz cited two Connecticut appellate decisions that
have made this assertion verbatim. State v. Almeda, 560 A.2d 389, 395 (Conn. 1989); Kelehear v.
Larcon, Inc., 577 A.2d 746, 749 (Conn. App. 1990).
34
Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 120–21 n.3 (Katz, J., concurring). Justice Katz emphasized that “the Code
is essentially an extension of the Practice Book,” because like the Practice Book, the Code makes the
law uniform and accessible, by providing a compilation of procedural rules that must be reviewed and
approved by the rules committee of the superior court. Id. at 122.
35
Id. at 124 (Borden, J., dissenting and concurring).
36
CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a) (2008).
30
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section 1-2(a) reads:
Case-by-case adjudication is integral to the growth and
development of evidentiary law and, thus, future definition of
the Code will be effected primarily through interpretation of
the Code and through judicial rule making. . . . Because the
Code was intended to maintain the status quo, i.e., preserve
the common-law rules of evidence as they existed prior to
adoption of the Code, its adoption is not intended to modify
any prior common-law interpretation of the rules.37
Justice Borden concluded that, when read together, this language limits
Code revisions to the judicial rulemaking process—the Evidence Code
oversight committee drafts rule changes and the superior court judges, as a
whole, approves such changes. The role of the appellate courts is thus
limited; interpretation is only permissible when the Code is silent or
unclear.38 Justice Borden also cited other evidence to emphasize that when
the Code was adopted, the judges of the superior court intended to
establish a Code that would not be subject to common law changes.
Therefore, both the language and intent of the Code bar the appellate
courts from changing the rules of evidence unless substantive
constitutional rights are violated.39
III. STATE V. DEJESUS: THE SUPREME COURT TRUMPS THE CODE
In State v. DeJesus, the Connecticut Supreme Court answered the
question left open in Sawyer, holding that the supreme court is not
constrained by the Code, but is free to change the rules therein.40 As in
Sawyer, the case presented the question of whether the court should change
the Code by expanding the exceptions to the admissibility of character
evidence.41 The court obliged, making a new rule allowing character
evidence when used to prove the defendant’s propensity for aberrant and
compulsive sexual behavior. Under such an exception, evidence of past
uncharged sexual misconduct is admissible if substantially similar to the
facts on trial.42 In DeJesus, the evidence in question was the testimony of
a woman claiming to have been sexually assaulted by the defendant. Like
37

Id. § 1-2(a) cmt. (a) (emphasis added).
See Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 125–27 (Borden, J., dissenting and concurring) (“[T]he Code provides
the courts with our full panoply of traditional powers in interpreting the Code and our full common-law
powers in fashioning new rules of evidence for instances that are not covered by the Code either
explicitly or implicitly.”).
39
See id. at 124–26 (Borden, J., dissenting and concurring).
40
953 A.2d 45, 59 (Conn. 2008).
41
Id. at 48–49. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is inadmissible to prove the
bad character or criminal tendencies of that person.” CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-5(a).
42
See DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 59–60 (adopting an exception to the prohibition of admitting bad
character evidence in sexual crime cases when such evidence demonstrates a common scheme or plan).
38
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the victim, she had a learning disability and worked at the same store
where the defendant was her manager.43 For policy reasons, the Court
adopted this exception to the propensity rule, though it is not found in the
Code.44
A. Plurality Opinion
Chief Justice Rogers, joined by Justices Norcott and Vertefeuille,
advanced two reasons to justify the court’s common law departure from
the rules in the Code. First, the purpose of creating the Code was to
provide a “restatement,” not a binding Code.45 By setting forth black letter
law, a “restatement” guides the development of a specific area of law, but
is not binding on the courts.46 In contrast, a “code” is a binding and
“complete system of positive law, carefully arranged and officially
promulgated; a systematic collection or revision of laws, rules, or
regulations.”47
Second, the plurality’s conclusion—that the Code was not intended to
bind the appellate courts—was strongly influenced by its doubts about the
constitutional power of the superior court to bind, with its rules, the
common law authority of the appellate courts.48 While this constitutional
issue is the driving force behind the plurality opinion, the holding itself is
not constitutional, but is instead grounded in the laws of statutory
construction. When a statute’s meaning is plain and unambiguous, courts
cannot interpret or construe that statute.49 However, when “a literal
reading places a statute in constitutional jeopardy . . . [courts] are bound to
assume that the legislature intended . . . to achieve its purpose in a manner
which is both effective and constitutional.”50 Accordingly, courts may
apply a judicial gloss and liberally interpret otherwise plain and
unambiguous but constitutionally suspect statutes.51 Following this tenet
of statutory construction, the plurality in DeJesus broadly interpreted the
plain language and intent of the drafters to alter but maintain the Evidence
Code, and only addressed the constitutional question in dicta.52
43

Id. at 50–51.
See id. at 76 (supplying two policy based arguments: first, that sex crimes are committed in
private locations where neutral witnesses are not likely to be present; and second, because sex crimes
are “of the unusually aberrant and pathological nature . . . [so past acts] are deemed to be highly
probative because they tend to establish a necessary motive or explanation for an otherwise
inexplicably horrible crime”).
45
Id. at 68.
46
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009).
47
Id. at 292.
48
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 68–69.
49
State v. Peters, 946 A.2d 1231, 1234–35 (Conn. 2008).
50
Moscone v. Manson, 440 A.2d 848, 851 (Conn. 1981).
51
State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157, 1160 (Conn. 1991).
52
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 68–69.
44
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The plurality began its analysis with an interpretation of section 1-2(a),
which reads, “The purposes of the Code are to adopt Connecticut case law
regarding rules of evidence as rules of court and to promote the growth and
development of the law of evidence through interpretation of the Code and
through judicial rule making . . . .”53 Here, the court found that this
language, when read together with the commentary, was ambiguous.
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Rogers argued that the term
“interpretation” as used in section 1-2(a), could have been intended to limit
“courts to explaining and construing the code in a manner similar to that in
which they explain and construe statutes enacted by the legislature.”54
This section of the Code, however, also states that its purpose is “to
promote the growth and development of the law of evidence through
interpretation of the Code and through judicial rule making.”55 The word
“interpretation” when read together with the language “to promote the
growth and development of the law of evidence,” indicates that the
traditional common law adjudicative method still could apply.
To support this claim, Chief Justice Rogers pointed to the commentary
to section 1-2(a), which states, “Case-by-case adjudication is integral to the
growth and development of evidentiary law and, thus, future definition of
the Code will be effected primarily through interpretation of the Code and
through judicial rule making.”56 Such a reference, she argued, was
included to allow for an expansive process of “interpretation.” Chief
Justice Rogers also asserted that “judicial rule making,” in this context,
could include both changes made by the Code oversight committee, and
changes via common law rule making.57 Because of this ambiguity, the
court found that a plain language interpretation could not resolve the
question of whether appellate courts are confined by the Code. Therefore,
the plurality turned to the history of the Code.58
From this history, the court concluded that the Code was created to
establish a restatement for the convenience and ease of practitioners and
judges; not to divest the supreme court of its common law authority to
create rules of evidence.59 The court emphasized that the Code’s history
did not include any discussion of divesting the supreme court of its
common law authority over evidence, citing the transcript from the annual
meeting of the judges of the superior court where the Code was adopted.
Such a large change to over two hundred years of evidence law would
likely have been discussed. As Chief Justice Rogers stated:
53

CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a) (2008).
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 62.
55
CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a).
56
Id. § 1-2(a) cmt. (a).
57
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 63.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 66.
54
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[D]ivesting this court of its inherent common-law and
constitutional adjudicative authority over evidentiary law, an
authority which this court has enjoyed since its inception, is
not a minor or picayune detail. One would assume that, at a
minimum such a sweeping consequence would merit a brief
mention in Justice Borden’s summation concerning the
purpose and impact of the code.60
The plurality went on to state that this conclusion was consistent with
the court’s responsibility to “interpret statutes in a manner that avoids
placing them in constitutional jeopardy.”61 The plurality explained that
interpreting the Code as divesting the supreme court of its evidentiary
powers could violate article V, section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution,
which reads, “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme
court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall,
from time to time, ordain and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of
these courts shall be defined by law.”62
The plurality noted that many state constitutions specifically
enumerate the roles and responsibilities of the various courts.63 Article V,
section 1, on the other hand, merely reads, “The powers and jurisdiction of
these courts shall be defined by law.”64 The plurality asserted that the
reason for this difference is “obvious.”65 When Connecticut formally
adopted its constitution in 1818, it did so with the intention of freezing the
jurisdiction of the court system as it was in 1818—with a “‘Supreme Court
as the state’s highest court of appellate jurisdiction and . . . the Superior
Court as the trial court of general jurisdiction.’”66
The court explained that, at the time of the Connecticut Constitution’s
inception, there was a supreme and superior court, each with its own
powers. The superior court was a court of general jurisdiction with
authority over the trial of causes, while the supreme court only had
authority over the correction of errors in law. According to the plurality,
when the constitution was enacted, these powers froze, and were insulated
from any changes short of a constitutional amendment.67
The court went on to examine evidence law from this era and
determined that, at the time of enactment, the Connecticut Supreme Court
had final authority over the rules of evidence. The court explained that
historically, beginning with English common law and moving forward to
60

Id. at 67 n.20.
Id. at 68.
62
CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1.
63
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69.
64
CONN. CONST. art. V, §1.
65
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69.
66
Id. (quoting Szarwak v. Warden, 355 A.2d 49, 59 (Conn. 1974)).
67
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69–70.
61
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colonial common law, “the ultimate authority over the rules and standards
governing the admissibility of evidence rested with the highest court of the
state.”68
Having interpreted article V as making such pre-constitutional, judicial
powers permanent, the court reasoned that denying the supreme court the
authority to make evidence rules would violate the state constitution.69
The plurality contrasted the history of evidence rule making to that of the
rules of practice. Prior to the Connecticut Constitution, the rules of
practice, unlike the rules of evidence, were exclusively in the hands of the
superior court judges who adopted the regulae generales, or general rules
of pleading, practice, and procedure.70
According to the plurality, this pre-constitutional superior court
function justified the exclusive control the superior court exercises over the
rules of practice.71 Making such a distinction was necessary to complete
the frozen jurisdiction argument. Prior to DeJesus, the superior court
judges exercised “unquestioned rule-making authority in matters of
procedure.”72 Had the plurality held otherwise, concluding that the rules of
practice are not binding on the supreme court, they would have gone
against over two hundred years of precedent.
B. Justice Palmer Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Palmer agreed with the plurality that the
Code did not revoke the supreme court’s ultimate and traditional common
law power over changes to the rules of evidence.73 Justice Palmer set out
two reasons for reaching this conclusion. Like the plurality, he found that
because the supreme court had common law authority over evidence law
making prior to 1818, its function as evidence rule maker was
constitutionally rooted. Second, Justice Palmer concluded that to deny the
supreme court the power to make changes to evidence law would violate
the court’s “inherent supervisory authority.”74
This supervisory authority is exercised by the supreme court when it
lacks constitutional authority to act, but the interests of justice require the
court to clarify an issue for the lower courts.75 Under this doctrine of
68

Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 90 (Katz, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 83 (Palmer, J., concurring).
74
Id. at 83–84 (Palmer, J., concurring).
75
Id. at 84 (Palmer, J., concurring). An example of the invocation of this supervisory authority is
State v. Coleman, 700 A.2d 14, 20 (Conn. 1997). In Coleman, the defendant pled guilty and was
sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. The defendant, however, had vacated his plea prior to
sentencing, and, on appeal, was awarded a new trial by jury where he was found guilty and sentenced
to 110 years in prison. Id. at 17. The defendant requested, but was denied, an explanation for the
69
70
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supervisory authority, Justice Palmer rejected the notion that the superior
court could hold the ultimate authority over the rules of evidence. To do
so would trump the supreme court’s inherent power over the administration
of justice and would “render that role advisory rather than supervisory.”76
Justice Palmer went on to conclude that this supervisory power even
permits the supreme court to change the rules in the Practice Book.77
C. Justice Zarella Concurrence
This final concurrence provided the most concise argument for why
the Code could not take evidentiary rule making away from the supreme
court. Unlike the plurality opinion, Justice Zarella saw no need to construe
the language, history, or intent of the Code writers. Justice Zarella
concluded that the supreme court’s authority over the rules of evidence
“existed at common law and was incorporated into the 1818 constitution”
and so cannot be taken away.78 In Justice Zarella’s words:
[T]he majority’s resolution of this question places too much
emphasis on determining the intent of the Superior Court
judges, thereby indicating that possession of such an intent
could be dispositive of our inquiry. This emphasis, coupled
with the majority’s repeated reference to this court’s
“inherent” and “constitutional” authority, creates unnecessary
ambiguity as to the actual scope of the Superior Court’s
authority over the law of evidence.79
With regard to the distinction between rules of evidence and rules of
practice, Justice Zarella agreed with the majority that the history of these
two bodies of law indicates that the final authority rested in separate
courts. Justice Zarella’s analysis relied on a statute passed in 1808, which
gave the superior court judges the power to enact rules of practice.80
sentence increase. Id. at 20. The Connecticut Supreme Court invoked its supervisory powers and
established a new rule that, if during the criminal sentencing phase of a trial, a defendant asked why his
sentence was increased from that established in the previous trial, the judge must provide justification
for the increase. Id. In reaching this decision, the court held that this was a procedural safeguard,
which the court had no constitutional or statutory power to impose, but instead was necessary to
promote transparency, fairness, and integrity of the judicial system. The court thus invoked its
supervisory powers to ensure public confidence and a fair sentencing process. Id. at 23. The concept
of supervisory authority is noteworthy and demands further investigation; however, such inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Note.
76
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 84 (Palmer, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 86 (Palmer, J., concurring).
78
Id. at 88 (Zarella, J., concurring).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 89–90 (Zarella, J., concurring) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 42, ch. 15, § 2 (1808)).
Justice Zarella referred to CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 42, ch. 15, § 2 (1808):
And be it further enacted, [t]hat the judges of the superior court, when
constituting a supreme court of errors, or met for any purpose, be, and they hereby
are empowered, to institute such rules of practice for the regulation of the said court
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However, Justice Zarella pointed out that, at that time, judges of the
superior court were the same judges who sat on the supreme court.
Accordingly, it is not clear whether these judges enacted the rules of
practice as trial judges or as appellate judges. Because of this ambiguity,
and because the issue did not need to be resolved under the facts of the
case at hand, Justice Zarella left it for another day.81
D. Justice Katz Dissent
Justice Katz, who sat on both the Law Revision Commission
Committee that drafted the Evidence Code and the subsequent Judicial
Committee that finalized it,82 issued a strong and compelling dissent.
Justice Katz concluded that the Evidence Code is “the functional
equivalent of laws,” which cannot be modified by the appellate court.83
She argued that the superior court is authorized by the Rules Enabling Act,
Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 to be the final arbiter of
evidence rules;84 that the text of the Code made clear that the rules of
evidence could only be modified by the Evidence Oversight Committee of
the Superior Court Rules Committee; and lastly, that such formal rule
making was the most prudent method for procedural evidence rule
development.
Justice Katz’s analysis began with the purpose of the Code. She
disagreed with the plurality’s assertion that the Code is a mere restatement
of the rules of evidence, arguing that the various drafting committees
would not have spent six years creating a restatement that already existed
and was regularly updated.85 Justice Katz then turned to the language of
of errors, and of the superior court in the respective circuits, as shall be deemed most
conducive to the administration of justice.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
81
Id. at 90 (Zarella, J., concurring).
82
See supra notes 8, 19 and accompanying text.
83
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 90–91 (Katz, J., dissenting).
84
Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 states in pertinent part:
(a) The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Appellate Court, and the
judges of the Superior Court shall adopt and promulgate and may from time to time
modify or repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and procedure in
judicial proceedings in courts in which they have the constitutional authority to
make rules, for the purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of
promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits. The
rules of the Appellate Court shall be as consistent as feasible with the rules of the
Supreme Court to promote uniformity in the procedure for the taking of appeals and
may dispense, so far as justice to the parties will permit while affording a fair
review, with the necessity of printing of records and briefs. Such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right or the jurisdiction of any of the
courts.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14 (2009).
85
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 94 (Katz, J., dissenting). Justice Katz explained that the Code was not
enacted as a handbook on evidence, but a Code, a title which renders it “the functional equivalent of
legislation.” Id. (quoting TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 13).
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the Code itself, specifically section 1-2(a), which states, “The purposes of
the Code are to adopt Connecticut case law regarding rules of evidence as
rules of court and to promote the growth and development of the law of
evidence through interpretation . . . and through judicial rule
making . . . .”86 Justice Katz described interpretation as the process of
construing language, not changing the meaning of the text or reading
something new into the text.87 She contrasted interpretation with judicial
rule making, which she described as a “legal term of art”88 denoting “the
exercise of a legislative type function” where law is established not by the
facts of a single case, but by general rules based on a broad scope of
considerations.89 From this express language, Justice Katz concluded that
the role of the appellate courts is limited to these two methods of growth
and development,90 and that the Code took away the appellate courts’
ability to modify evidence rules.91
To further advance this textual argument, Justice Katz analyzed the
savings clause in section 1-2(b) of the Code. The savings clause
specifically allows courts to make new common law evidence rules where
the Code does not include a rule for an evidentiary procedure.92 Justice
Katz asserted that such a clause would be superfluous if the methods of
growth and development enumerated in the Code included common law
adjudication. She also described how the savings clause was modeled on
the Connecticut Statutory Penal Code Savings Code. The purpose of
attaching a savings clause to the penal code was to prevent appellate courts
from using common law authority to modify the crimes and defenses set
forth in the Penal Code, further supporting her argument.93 Justice Katz
went on to illustrate that this interpretation had been adopted in a 2002
Connecticut Supreme Court decision where the court refused to change an
evidentiary rule contained within the Code, stating:
If, as the defendant suggests, we were to read § 4-5(c) as
permitting introduction of evidence regarding a victim’s
specific violent acts, we would be interpreting the code in a
manner that would effectuate a substantive change in the law.
Because such a result would be contrary to the express
86

CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a) (2008).
To reach this conclusion, Justice Katz relied in part on Black’s Law Dictionary. DeJesus, 953
A.2d at 95, 101 (Katz, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 101.
89
Id. at 95.
90
Id. at 94.
91
Id. at 110 (Katz, J., dissenting).
92
CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(b) (2008).
93
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 96–97 (Katz, J., dissenting). The relevant language of the Penal Code
reads, “The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as precluding any court from recognizing
other principles of criminal liability or other defenses not inconsistent with such provisions.” CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-4 (2009).
87
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94

intention of the code’s drafters, we reject it.

To further illustrate that growth and development were limited to
judicial rule making, and did not extend to common law adjudication,
Justice Katz emphasized that the Evidence Code Oversight Committee was
charged with making recommendations to the Superior Court Rules
Committee when changes to the Evidence Code were needed.95
Finding the Code’s language unambiguous, Justice Katz rejected the
plurality’s inquiry into the judicial history of the Code. She concluded,
however, that even if the history is examined, it supports her argument that
the Code is binding on the appellate courts. Justice Katz asserted that the
superior court judges, experienced in judicial rule making from the
Practice Book, understood that they were adopting a binding Code, not a
handbook. Justice Katz argued that Justice Borden’s failure to specifically
state that the Code was binding when presenting the Code to the superior
court judges did not warrant the plurality’s conclusion that the superior
court judges did not understand that they were divesting the appellate
courts of their common law adjudicative authority over evidence law.96
Justice Katz went on to offer what she called “anecdotal evidence” of
the drafters’ intent that the Code be binding. For instance, a letter from
Justice Borden asked the Evidence Code Committee to consider a rule
allowing the supreme court to modify or change rules contained within the
Code.97 Katz concluded that in rejecting this rule, the Code’s drafters
showed their intention to enact a binding code.98 She also cited the
Handbook on Evidence, written by Colin Tait, who sat on the Code’s
drafting committee, which reads, “The Code could be ‘interpreted’ through
judicial opinions, or the Code could be amended through the judicial rulemaking process. But changes to the Code itself were to be accomplished
only through judicial rule-making, not judicial decisions.”99 From this
history, Justice Katz concluded that the drafters intended to establish a
binding code of evidence, which the appellate courts were required to
follow except where there was an ambiguous rule,100 a conflict of rules, or
where the Code was silent.101
94

State v. Whitford, 799 A.2d 1034, 1051 (Conn. 2002) (emphasis added).
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 97–98 (Katz, J., dissenting).
96
Id. at 101–03 (Katz, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 102, 103 n.14 (Katz, J., dissenting).
98
In this section of the opinion, Justice Katz did not cite Justice Borden’s specific interpretations
to which she referred. She did, however, reference Justice Borden’s Connecticut Bar Journal article
and his dissenting opinion in State v. Sawyer. Id. at 99–100, 102 (Katz, J., dissenting).
99
TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 16–17 (emphasis added); see also DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 100
n.12 (noting that Professor Colin Tait also interpreted the rules set forth in the Code as binding upon
the appellate courts).
100
See DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 108 (Katz, J., dissenting). The Evidence Code does not include
evidentiary laws set forth in statutes or in the Practice Book. TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 7–8.
101
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 100 (Katz, J., dissenting).
95
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Justice Katz argued that there is no pre-constitutional analogy to justify
the conclusion that the Connecticut Constitution froze the jurisdiction of
the constitutional courts over the rules of evidence. In her words:
The mere fact that, predating our constitution, this court had
set forth rules of evidence in the context of an adjudication
simply demonstrates what is undisputed—that this court has
authority to do so—it does not answer the question in
dispute, that is, whether another judicial body can adopt rules
that this court cannot overrule.102
Katz compared the Evidence Code to the Practice Book, and concluded
that they are functionally equivalent. She noted that the Practice Book has
withstood several constitutional challenges—all of which pertain to the
separation of powers doctrine and none of which have suggested “that the
procedure within the judicial branch itself may be constitutionally
suspect.”103
Additionally, Justice Katz argued that the superior court is authorized
to create a binding code pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.104 This statute
gives the superior, appellate, or supreme court the authority to make rules
of pleading, practice, and judicial procedure.105 Justice Katz noted that,
unlike many state constitutions, the Connecticut Constitution does not
specifically prescribe that final authority over procedural matters be vested
in the supreme court.106 In light of this absence, the legislature enacted the
Rules Enabling Act. It is under this Act that the superior court finds its
authority to enact the rules of practice.107
Justice Katz also rejected the argument advanced by Justice Palmer
that the supreme court maintains the authority to modify and change any
rule of evidence under an inherent supervisory authority. She interpreted
this supervisory authority as one to be employed only when other
procedures or rules were unavailable, not to contravene an existing rule or
procedure.108
Justice Katz also noted that the superior court judges’ proximity to the
practical effect of evidence rules makes them best-equipped to make those
102

Id. at 107 (Katz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 104 (Katz, J., dissenting).
104
See id. at 107 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“Thus, given . . . the delegation of authority under § 51-14,
I see nothing to indicate that a constitutional conflict would arise by construing the code, as written, to
allow the judges of the Superior Court to make rules that bind this court.”).
105
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a) (2009).
106
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 106–07 (Katz, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 98 (Katz, J., dissenting). These rules of practice are compiled in the Connecticut Practice
Book.
108
See id. at 107–09 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“[The court’s] authority is exercised in the absence of
a rule, when there are gaps in a rule or to supplement procedures under a rule. . . . [T]his court
previously has recognized the limits of its inherent supervisory authority when a conflict would arise
with an existing rule.”).
103
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rules. Lastly, she emphasized the importance of separating the rulemaking
process from the adversarial process so that the Code would be broader
than single party interests would dictate.109
IV. DISSECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT110
While several analyses and criticisms of the DeJesus opinions could be
discussed, this Note focuses on the constitutional question raised. The
plurality in DeJesus argued that the essential functions of the superior and
supreme courts, as they existed prior to the Connecticut Constitution, were
frozen with the ratification of the constitution in 1818. Under the
plurality’s interpretation, one such essential function is the making of
procedural evidence law. To the plurality, this creates a constitutional
grant of “final and binding authority” over evidence law that cannot be
taken away short of a constitutional amendment.111
This Note reaches the opposite conclusion. It concludes that the
Connecticut Constitution does not preclude the superior court from having
the final power to promulgate the rules of evidence. Making rules of
evidence is not an essential characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme
Court. Consequently, that power was not frozen with the constitution of
1818, leaving the legislature the constitutional authority to grant the
superior court the power to codify the rules of evidence. However, as
discussed below, decades of debate and uncertainty surround this assertion.
This Note concludes that a constitutional amendment, defining the
judiciary’s rulemaking authority, is necessary to resolve this dispute.
A. Brief History of Connecticut’s Constitution
In order to understand this issue, the historical underpinnings of the
Connecticut Constitution must be laid out. “A constitution—our own
especially—is the outgrowth of a people’s history, the result of past
experience and of existing conditions; and it is impossible to ascertain its
real meaning without studying the conditions it was framed to meet, and
109

Id. at 109–10 (Katz, J., dissenting).
This Note does not discuss the plurality’s interpretation of the language or intention of the
Code’s drafters.
[T]he power of the Supreme Court to alter the rules set forth in the Code by common
law adjudication was not discussed in so many words in the Code. The clear
inference to be taken from [Connecticut Code of Evidence] §§ 1-2(a) and 1-2(b) . . .
negates such a power as being inconsistent with those explicit provisions of the
Code.
COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE 2 (4th ed. Supp.
2009). That the plurality did find the language ambiguous, however, indicates that it may not be such a
“clear inference” that the Code was intended to divest the Connecticut Supreme Court of its rulemaking
authority. The merits of such statutory interpretation as well as the supervisory authority argument
raised by Justice Palmer are beyond the scope of this Note.
111
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 71.
110
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the fundamental principles it was adopted to secure.”
Unlike most
states, Connecticut did not ratify a constitution immediately after the
American Revolution. When Connecticut did ratify its constitution,
eighteen states had already done so, leaving only Connecticut and Rhode
Island without constitutions.113 It has been argued that the Revolution had
little impact on Connecticut’s system of governance because, even prior to
the Revolution, Connecticut had been mostly self-governing. For example,
when passing statutes, the Connecticut legislature did not need to seek
approval from the King of England and the legislature did not follow acts
passed by the British Parliament.114 One of Connecticut’s greatest early
legal scholars, Zephaniah Swift, described Connecticut’s pre-revolutionary
relationship with England as a “nominal allegiance to the British crown”
recognized only for purposes of defense and protection.115 Instead of
ratifying a constitution, Connecticut continued to operate under the laws
created by the Royal Charter.116
The pre-constitutional judicial system in Connecticut consisted of a
supreme court, a superior court, and inferior courts—the court of common
pleas, justices of the peace, and the probate courts.117 The superior court
was established in 1711 and originally consisted of five judges appointed
by the legislature.118 This was a court of general jurisdiction, with
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the three inferior courts and the
power to issues writs of mandamus to those courts.119 The Connecticut
Supreme Court was established seventy-three years later in 1784 and
consisted of twelve judges,120 mostly practicing attorneys. It sat once a
year to review decisions of the superior court. In 1808, there was a
reorganization of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Politicians, who
previously could sit on the supreme court, were no longer permitted, and as
Connecticut constitutional scholar Wesley Horton describes, this was the
“start of a truly judicial supreme court.”121 Judicial decisions, however,
112
113

(2008).

Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 168 (Conn. 1894).
Id. at 168; WESLEY W. HORTON, THE HISTORY OF THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT 29

114
HORTON, supra note 113, at 10; see HENRY C. ROBINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
CONNECTICUT 1–2 (1897) (describing Connecticut’s unique form of governance: “Unlike all the other
colonists, and greatly in advance of them, the Connecticut founders disclosed to history a new vision of
democracy. . . . [T]hey were democrats of democrats.”).
115
ZEPHANIA SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 57 (1795).
116
Jarvis M. Morse, Under the Constitution of 1818: The First Decade, in TERCENTENARY
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, COMMITTEE ON HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS 3–4 (1933).
117
See SWIFT, supra note 115, at 58–60.
118
From 1800–06, the superior court consisted of six judges who sat in panels of three; from
1806–18, the court was composed of nine judges who also sat in panels of three. HORTON, supra note
113, at 14.
119
See HORTON, supra note 113, at 11; SWIFT, supra note 115, at 60.
120
The judges were the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Council. SWIFT, supra note
115, at 60.
121
HORTON, supra note 113, at 13.
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even those of the Connecticut Supreme Court, were not final, as the
legislature retained plenary authority to review and reverse court
decisions.122
Gradually, a movement formed in Connecticut that pushed for the
adoption of a constitution.123 The constitutional proponents argued that the
Charter of 1662 granted by King Charles, had not been democratically
adopted by the people of Connecticut.124 Since Connecticut was no longer
under the control of the crown, operating under this charter was
questionable.125 The legislature’s supreme power over all three branches
of government, with no defined separation of powers and the need for
separation of church and state also drove the enactment of the
constitution.126 Additionally, a “major force behind the convening of the
constitutional convention ‘was the growth of the Jeffersonian party and its
desire to reform the electoral process and to disestablish the
Congregational Church.’”127
The catalyst to the constitutional convention was Lung’s Case of
1815.128 The defendant, Peter Lung, was sentenced to death by the
superior court, and his conviction was affirmed by the Connecticut
Supreme Court. Lung then petitioned the General Assembly for
reconsideration of the verdict. The legislature found the trial was
procedurally improper, reversed the verdict, and ordered a new trial.129
This intrusion by the legislative branch into a purely judicial matter
furthered the momentum toward a constitutional convention.
Three years later, a constitutional convention was held in Hartford
from August 26 to September 15, 1818, to draft the constitution. By
referendum, the people of Connecticut ratified the state constitution.130

122

See id. at 29.
Morse, supra note 116, at 1; ROBINSON, supra note 114, at 13.
124
One of the earliest calls for a constitution came in 1804 at a meeting of Republican delegates
from ninety-seven Connecticut towns who met and asserted “‘as the unanimous opinion of this meeting
that the people of this State are at present without a constitution of civil Government.’” At this meeting
were five magistrates and justices of the peace who had their commissions revoked thereafter by the
Governor and legislature for making such an assertion. ROBINSON, supra note 114, at 13.
125
As mentioned earlier, another school of thought asserted that Connecticut was unique in that it
never followed British rule anyway, so the system of governance established prior to the Revolution
was still in place after the Revolution. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16.
126
Connecticut had become a state dominated by Congregationalists. ROBINSON, supra note 114,
at 13–14.
127
Kinsella v. Jaekle, 475 A.2d 243, 250–51 n.12 (Conn. 1984) (quoting Richard S. Kay, The
Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.27 (1975)).
128
Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815).
129
HORTON, supra note 113, at 29; William M. Maltbie, The Unconstitutional Period of
Connecticut History, 14 CONN. B.J. 22, 32 (1940).
130
Morse, supra note 116, at 4.
123
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B. Plain Meaning Interpretation of Connecticut Constitution Article V,
Section 1 as It Relates to the Separation of Powers Within the Judicial
Branch and Between the Legislature and Judiciary
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitutional interpretation . . . .”131 Beginning with a plain
meaning interpretation of article II and article V, section 1, it is difficult to
understand the plurality’s argument that the constitution forever froze the
supreme court’s power to make rules of evidence. Instead, the text only
requires there to be a superior court of general jurisdiction, a supreme court
of appellate jurisdiction, and three separate branches of government. The
text of articles II and V neither defines nor limits the extent to which each
branch has procedural judicial rulemaking power.
Article V, section 1 of the 1818 Connecticut Constitution reads, “The
judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Errors, a
Superior Court, and such inferiour courts as the General Assembly shall,
from time to time, ordain and establish: the powers and jurisdiction of
which courts shall be defined by law.”132 This section of the constitution
has remained largely unchanged; however, it was amended in the 1965
constitutional convention—the term “inferiour courts” was replaced by
“lower courts” and the colon was replaced by a period so that the phrase,
“the powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law,” now
stands alone. Lastly, the term “of errors” was removed from the title of the
Connecticut Supreme Court. The clause now reads, “The judicial power of
the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a superior court, and such
lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and
establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by
law.”133
This language does specifically name two courts—a supreme court and
a superior court. The text does not specify the names of the lower courts,
but instead uses the term “inferior courts.” Because of this textual
distinction, the supreme and superior courts are considered constitutional
courts while the inferior courts are not.134 The powers of the constitutional
courts are defined by the constitution itself and such powers cannot be
changed by the courts or by the legislature short of a constitutional
amendment. Inferior courts, however, have no such limitation. Their
jurisdiction can be altered if such changes do not significantly erode the
131

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
CONN. CONST. art V, § 1 (1818).
CONN. CONST. art V, § 1 (2008); see also Szarwak v. Warden, 355 A.2d 49, 58 (Conn. 1974).
134
These courts are also described as “lower courts” as a result of the 1965 change made during
the constitutional convention.
132
133
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jurisdiction granted to the supreme or superior court by the constitution.
Certainly there is significance in the fact that the Connecticut
Constitution specifically named a supreme and superior court. The
inclusion of the term “supreme court of errors” indicates that there must be
an appellate court, while the inclusion of the term “superior court”
indicates that there must be a court of general jurisdiction.136 This
interpretation is reinforced by the 1818 Journal of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of Connecticut. The journal includes a motion
to amend article V, section 1 “by striking out the words ‘of errors, a
superior court,’ and inserting in lieu thereof these words: ‘which shall
consist of a chief judge, and not more than four other judges.’”137 Such a
change would have created one constitutional court—a supreme court,
without any jurisdictional distinction between it and the superior court.
The motion was rejected, 138 strengthening the theory that the intention of
the drafters of article V was to create two distinct constitutional courts.
It seems to be a great leap, however, to interpret the inclusion of these
courts’ names as an indication that their powers, in every aspect, were to
forever remain the same as in 1818. While the clause does specifically
state there will be “a supreme court” and “a superior court,”139 the clause
does not read “the supreme court” or “the superior court.” Analyzing the
grammatical choice of the article “a” instead of “the” leads to a conclusion
contrary to that reached by the DeJesus plurality. The use of “a
superior/supreme court” suggests that the functions of these courts were
not frozen; rather, the framers intended for these courts to grow and
develop while maintaining their essential characteristics—one court with
appellate jurisdiction and one with general jurisdiction. Had the drafters
instead written “the superior/supreme court,” the frozen jurisdiction
argument would be more plausible.
Additionally, the last sentence of article V, section 1, asserting that the
powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law,140 suggests
that the legislature was granted the power to alter the procedural powers of
the constitutional courts.141 This clause has been a source of great
135

See Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, 32 A.2d 547, 554–55 (Conn. 1943).
See WILLIAM BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS: IN HISTORY, IN
THEORY AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS 31 (1998) (stating that where “constitutions confer the judicial
power upon certain specified courts, this must be understood to embrace the whole judicial power, and
the legislature cannot in such case pass a statute abolishing any such courts, or vest any portion of such
power elsewhere”). General clauses giving courts judicial power does not give them all judicial powers
but only the power to “determine and protect legal rights.” Id. at 77.
137
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF CONNECTICUT 67 (Hartford, Case,
Lockwood & Brainard 1873).
138
Id.
139
CONN. CONST. art V, § 1.
140
Id.
141
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a) (2009).
136
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controversy and debate among Connecticut legal scholars.
The dispute
is whether this last sentence applies to the inferior courts only or also to the
two constitutional courts. In Styles v. Tyler, a prominent case examining
this issue, the majority concluded that while this last sentence of article V,
section 1 grants legislative authority to define certain judicial powers and
procedures, that authority is limited when the “jurisdiction [is]
substantially described” by the constitution.143 Accordingly, the Styles
court found that the constitution precludes the legislature from altering an
essential characteristic of the judiciary.144 From this, the court held that the
statute in question did not intend to extend the jurisdiction of the supreme
court to the review of factual findings because such an extension of power
would violate the constitution.145 In his dissenting opinion, however,
Justice Baldwin asserted:
If the ordinary rules of grammar are to be respected, the last
clause in section 1 of article 5, both as originally punctuated
and as finally engrossed and adopted, qualifies each member
of the preceding clause. Its construction must be the same as
if it read thus: “The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court of errors, the powers and
jurisdiction of which shall be defined by law; a superior
court, the powers and jurisdiction of which shall be defined
by law; and such inferior courts as the general assembly
shall, from time to time, ordain and establish, the powers and
jurisdiction of which shall be defined by law.”146
Under Justice Baldwin’s interpretation, the legislature reserves the
authority to make laws governing judicial procedure, and therefore, the
powers and structure of the courts as they existed in 1818 were not frozen.
The broadly defined distribution of powers set forth in the Connecticut
Constitution further supports the argument that the legislature has the
constitutional power to prescribe procedural judicial functions. Article II
reads: “The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit,
those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another;
and those which are judicial, to another.”147 Unlike twenty-eight other
142

See, e.g., Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 177–78 (Conn. 1894) (Baldwin, J., dissenting); Kay,
supra note 127, at 7.
143
Styles, 30 A. at 172.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 173–75.
146
Id. at 178 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
147
CONN. CONST. art. II. The text of this article has been amended by article XVIII, which in full
reads:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative,
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state constitutions,
Connecticut’s constitution does not include any
clause specifically limiting the branches from overlapping. Also, unlike
many state constitutions, Connecticut’s constitution does not specifically
grant rulemaking authority to the courts.149 Since the framers did not
specifically distinguish the functions of these branches, functions such as
judicial procedure may overlap. The extent of this overlap is limited by the
powers specifically granted to each branch by the constitution. For
example, the constitution empowers the Connecticut Supreme Court to be
the court of appellate jurisdiction, so the legislature is constitutionally
barred from overturning supreme court decisions as they had done prior to
the constitution.150
Nevertheless, in Connecticut, “[s]ome doubt exists as to the
constitutionality of such statutory rules [governing judicial procedure],
because of the line of cases culminating in the opinion of the Connecticut
Supreme Court in State v. Clemente” in 1974.151 The Clemente court held
that a statute prescribing a rule of discovery was unconstitutional because
the legislature was involving itself in an exclusively judicial procedural
matter, thus violating the separation of powers doctrine.152 The Clemente
court recognized that the separation of powers is not to be “rigidly applied”
and that the
great functions of government are not divided in any such
way that all acts of the nature of the functions of one
department can never be exercised by another department.
Such a division is impracticable, and, if carried out, would
result in the paralysis of government. Executive, legislative,
and judicial powers of necessity overlap each other, and
cover many acts which are in their nature common to more
to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another. The legislative department may delegate regulatory authority to the
executive department; except that any administrative regulation of any agency of the
executive department may be disapproved by the general assembly or a committee
thereof in such manner as shall by law be prescribed.
CONN. CONST. art. XVIII.
148
John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1236–41 (1993).
149
The South Carolina Constitution, for instance, grants its supreme court the exclusive power to
make rules governing the administration of all state courts, the rules of practice and procedure and the
power to regulate attorney conduct. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4. Other state constitutions including such
provisions include VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (stating that the supreme court makes rules of practice and
procedure but these cannot conflict with any legislative rules); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (stating that
the court of appeals makes rules governing the administration of appellate court practice and procedure,
but these rules can be modified otherwise by law); W.VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (stating that courts have
the power to make rules of practice and procedure); and N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (stating that the
supreme court has exclusive power over rules of practice and procedure for appellate courts).
150
See text accompanying notes 126 and 131–38.
151
TAIT, supra note 6, at 10.
152
State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 729–31 (Conn. 1974).
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153

than one department.

The court devised a two-part test for determining whether a statute is
unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers provision: first the
statute must involve a judicial subject matter, and second, that subject
matter must be under the exclusive control of the judiciary.154 Following
Clemente, all statutes involving procedural rule making considered to be
exclusively judicial are constitutionally questionable.155
It is not clear from Clemente whether or not rules of evidence fall in
this exclusively judicial procedural realm. In State v. James, the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that “[u]nlike the practices and principles
relating to discovery, which were deemed in Clemente to be within the
exclusive power of the courts, the rules of evidence, including those
relating to the competency of witnesses, have never in this state been
regarded as exclusively within the judicial domain.”156 In James, the
defendant, relying on Clemente, asserted that an evidentiary statute enacted
by the legislature was unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislature
violated the separation of powers provision in the constitution. The court
disagreed and found that, unlike rules of practice and procedure, the
legislature and judiciary have historically shared rulemaking authority over
the rules of evidence and the courts have recognized that legislative
authority as legitimate. The court concluded that rules of evidence are not
exclusively judicial in nature, but instead, the legislature has the
constitutional power to enact rules of evidence.157 From this holding it
could follow that if the legislature and judiciary share power over evidence
rule making, the legislature could have the authority to delegate power
over such rules exclusively to the superior court. Since the James court
asserted that evidentiary rule making is not exclusively judicial, it left open
the ability of the legislature to grant final and binding authority to the
superior court over rules of evidence.
An alternative argument, however, could be made that while the
legislature reserves the power to enact statutes containing evidence rules,
the power to vest sole authority over writing those rules to the superior
court is a Clemente-type procedural matter that falls under the exclusive
control of the judiciary. Such uncertainty illustrates the need for judicial
clarification or a constitutional amendment clearly delineating the
boundaries between the legislative and judicial powers over judicial
procedure.

153

Id. at 728 (quoting In re Application of Clark, 31 A. 522, 527 (Conn. 1894)).
Id. at 729.
For a critical examination of the holding in Clemente, see generally Kay, supra note 127.
156
State v. James, 560 A.2d 426, 430 (Conn. 1989).
157
Id. at 431.
154
155
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C. Historical Interpretation of Article V as It Relates to the Separation of
Powers Within the Judicial Branch and Between the Legislature and
Judiciary
In addition to the textual argument above, the history of the
Connecticut Constitution illustrates that the framers did not intend to freeze
the powers of the courts as they existed before 1818 or to create a strict
separation of powers. When the constitution was ratified in 1818, the
supreme court had only existed for thirty-four years in contrast to the 107year-old superior court.158 During this brief era, the supreme court had
been restructured twice, first in 1808 and then in 1818 with the
constitution.159 It is hard to believe that the framers would intend for a
system that existed for such a brief amount of time, which was still in a
state of flux, to be forever frozen. Instead, it seems that the framers
anticipated the law’s need for change, growth, and development. To
accommodate such change, the powers of the Connecticut Supreme and
Superior Courts were left largely undefined, establishing only the idea that
there must always be a court of general jurisdiction and a court of appellate
jurisdiction.
The main concern of the framers with regard to the separation of
powers was to prevent the legislature from making judicial decisions,
which it had done in Lung’s Case.160 That the framers did not intend for
the constitution to take away the legislature’s role in determining the
jurisdiction and procedures of the constitutional courts can be seen in the
enactment of statutes following ratification of the constitution. The Public
Statute Laws of Connecticut, revised and enacted by the General Assembly
in 1821, just three years after the constitution was ratified, illustrate that
the legislature retained power over judicial procedure even after the
branches were constitutionally separated. 161 Therefore, it is unlikely that
the powers of the pre-constitutional courts were intended to be frozen in
perpetuity.
In the preface to these statutes, those charged with redrafting the laws,
158

HORTON, supra note 113, at 12, 29.
Id. at 13, 30–31.
160
See Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815); PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, AS REVISED AND ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, tit. 21, § 41 n.1 (1821)
(“Though the legislature, from time to time, had stripped themselves of their judicial power, by
delegating it to other tribunals . . . [a]n opinion seems to have been entertained, that, as they were not
limited in their power, like a judicial tribunal, they could, acting, on more elevated and extended
principles, do more complete justice, than could be obtained in a court of law, or even in a court of
equity . . . . Experience demonstrated, that nothing could be more improper or dangerous, than the
exercise of such an arbitrary discretion, by the legislature. Accordingly, the constitution has now, in
conformity to correct principles, divided the powers of government into three distinct departments, and
confided each of them to a separate magistracy: of course, the legislature cannot interpose in matters of
a private nature, between parties, without infringing that instrument.”).
161
PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 160.
159

1018

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:991
162

including Connecticut legal scholar Zephaniah Swift, explain that this
set of statutes was revised and certain statutes repealed or rewritten
specifically for the purpose of making the laws consistent with the newly
ratified constitution.163 These statutes were revised at a time when the
constitution and its purpose were fresh in the minds of these re-drafters and
thus are good evidence of the constitution’s meaning as understood at the
time of the drafting.
Of these statutes, the most important to this Note are title 21, sections
1–41, “An Act for Constituting and Regulating Courts, and for Appointing
the Times and Places of Holding the Same.”164 This Act sets forth the
powers and jurisdiction of both constitutional courts and the inferior
courts. The supreme court was given final jurisdiction over all cases
asserting an error of law or equity.165 The Connecticut Supreme Court was
also given the power to institute rules of practice for that court and for the
superior court,166 to assign judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court to
certain counties,167 to establish rules for when court can be adjourned,168
and to publish the rationale behind their decisions.169 In these revised
statutes, the superior court was given general jurisdiction over the trial of
criminal and civil causes,170 was required to appoint a clerk, could order
pleadings, and was given the power to adjourn sessions.171
The legislature’s delineation of the roles, procedures, and jurisdiction
of these two constitutional courts, combined with the fact that this set of
statutes was revised specifically to ensure their conformity with the
constitution, indicate that the constitutional framers did not intend to limit
the functions of the constitutional courts to those of 1818. Instead, this
history suggests that the framers envisioned a more flexible system of
governance with room for growth and development, under the control of
the legislature. It has been argued that these early statutes should not be
considered when interpreting the constitution because the full import and
meaning of the separation of powers was not understood until the late
nineteenth century,172 with judicial decisions such as Styles v. Tyler and
Appeal of Norwalk Street Railway Co.173 It is argued that these later
162

The redrafters were Zephaniah Swift, Lemuel Whitman, and Thomas Day. See id. at x.
Id. at viii.
164
Id. tit. 21 §§ 1–41.
165
Id. tit. 21 § 3.
166
Id. tit. 21 § 5.
167
Id. tit. 21 § 4.
168
Id. tit. 21 § 6.
169
Id. tit. 21 §§ 7–8.
170
Id. tit. 21 § 9.
171
Id. tit. 21 §§ 13–15.
172
See Adams v. Rubinow, 251 A.2d 49, 55 (Conn. 1968) (“In the period from 1818 until the
decision in Norwalk Street Railway Co.’s Appeal in 1897. . . there was a failure to appreciate the full
import and application of Article 2.” (internal citation omitted)).
173
37 A. 1080 (Conn. 1897).
163
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judicial decisions “clearly determined that (1) the constitution represented
a grant of power from the people, in whom all power originally resided,
and (2) the powers granted to the General Assembly are legislative only
and those granted to the judiciary are judicial only.”174 This rationale,
which still stands as good law, is unpersuasive, as it is difficult to argue
that those involved in the framing of the constitution would not understand
the meaning of the document they themselves had drafted.
D. The Rules Enabling Act
From the textual and historical interpretation above it can be concluded
that the legislature is constitutionally granted the power to allocate
procedural rulemaking authority to the superior court. Through the Rules
Enabling Act, Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14, the legislature
has done just that and vested in the superior court the authority to make
rules of procedure.175 Assuming an evidence code is procedural in
nature,176 this statute can be interpreted as granting the superior court the
power to adopt a binding code of evidence. Neither the plurality nor
concurring opinion, however, address this legislative grant of power when
reaching their decisions in DeJesus.
The Rules Enabling Act, first enacted in 1957, currently reads in part:
(a) The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the
Appellate Court, and the judges of the Superior Court shall
adopt and promulgate and may from time to time modify or
repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and
procedure in judicial proceedings in courts in which they
have the constitutional authority to make rules, for the
purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of
promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation
upon its merits. . . . (b) . . . The chief justice shall report any
such rules to the general assembly for study at the beginning
of each regular session.177
Rather than discussing this Act, the plurality, in dicta, crafted an
argument about a procedural separation of powers within the judicial
branch. The plurality asserted that the essential characteristics, powers,
and jurisdiction of the constitutional courts were forever frozen as they
existed when the constitution was ratified in 1818. The plurality concluded
that evidentiary rule making is one such essential characteristic. The
plurality found that the supreme court had the common law authority to
174

Szarwak v. Warden, 355 A.2d 49, 59 (Conn. 1974); Morse, supra note 116, at 15, 19.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14 (2009).
176
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
177
CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14.
175
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make rules of evidence at the constitution’s inception, and so concluded
that it must continue to have such authority in perpetuity.178
This argument assumes constitutional limits on the interference with or
invasion into procedural rule making by each constitutional court. The
case law cited by the plurality fails to support this proposition because it
pertains to the separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary
and to the essential functions of the judicial branch, but not to any
separation of procedural powers within the judicial branch itself.
The series cited by the plurality begins with the well-known 1894 case,
Styles v. Tyler.179 In Styles, Justice Hamersley, writing for the majority,
held that the supreme court is an appellate court limited to the review of
errors of law, and so cannot review purely factual errors. The rationale
was that by specifically naming two courts within article V, the
constitution designated the jurisdiction of the courts—“one with a supreme
jurisdiction of the trial of causes and one with a supreme and final
jurisdiction in determining in the last resort the principles of law involved
in the trial of causes.”180 It held that only these essential characteristics of
the two constitutional courts were frozen upon ratification of the
constitution.
Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, the next case in the series cited by the DeJesus
plurality for the proposition that “‘[t]here can be no doubt that it was the
intent of the [1818] constitution that [the superior court] should continue,
with the essential characteristics it had previously possessed,’”181
considered the constitutionality under article V, section 1 of a legislative
act establishing a Court of Common Pleas as an inferior court.182 The issue
was whether the legislature had the constitutional authority to determine
and extend the jurisdiction of an inferior court, or if in doing so they were
infringing upon the powers vested in the superior courts by the Connecticut
Constitution. The Walkinshaw court asserted that deeming a statute
unconstitutional is of “very grave concern” and that under the Connecticut
Constitution the legislature has authority over all state affairs, unless it is
limited by other provisions of the constitution.183 The court found the
statute constitutional because while almost altering the essential
characteristics of the superior court, the change was not significant enough

178

State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 72 (Conn. 2008).
Id. at 70 (citing Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165 (Conn. 1894)).
180
Styles, 30 A. at 171.
181
DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69–70 (quoting Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, 32 A.2d 547, 549 (Conn.
1943)).
182
Walkinshaw, 32 A.2d at 549. The legislative act in question established one single court of
common pleas, whereas previously there existed six courts throughout the state that had exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from justices of the peace and municipal courts when those appeals did not by
law have to go before the superior court.
183
Id. at 552 (citations omitted).
179
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to justify overturning the statute.
The final case cited by the plurality to support the frozen jurisdiction
argument was Szarwak v. Warden.185 In Szarwak, the court found
unconstitutional a statute that gave the circuit courts jurisdiction over
crimes punishable by fines of less than $5000 or imprisonment of less than
five years because this transfer of jurisdiction took away the essential
characteristics of the superior court. The court asserted that “[t]he test
determinative of the constitutionality of a statute granting jurisdiction to a
lower court is then, one of degree.”186 Finding that the legislature had
disregarded the mandate in Walkinshaw to stop eroding the jurisdiction of
the superior court, the court held that this statute went too far and altered
the essential characteristics of the superior court.187
None of the cases cited interpret the constitution as freezing all the
procedural powers of the courts. In Styles, Justice Hamersley described the
extent of these “essential characteristics”:
The description of jurisdiction contained in the constitution
determines only the essential characteristics of that
jurisdiction, and does not deal with the procedure by means
of which the jurisdiction is called into exercise . . . the
exercise of that jurisdiction may practically be limited or
extended in consequence of changes of procedure not
inconsistent with such characteristics.188
Under the Styles rationale, evidence rule making may rest solely with
the superior court because this is a “change of procedure, not inconsistent
with such [essential] characteristics”189 of the supreme court. By placing
the Evidence Code in the hands of the superior court, the supreme court
still has final say on constitutional issues which may arise from the
Code190—just like the supreme court reviews statutes for constitutionality,
so does it retain the power to review the Evidence Code for constitutional
infringements. Therefore, the Evidence Code can rest with the superior
court without violating the state constitution because it does not take the
court’s appellate jurisdiction on constitutional matters, but instead is only
184

Id. It is interesting to note that one of the citations used here to support the proposition that the
essential characteristics previously possessed by the constitutional courts were frozen with the
constitution is a statute enacted three years after the ratification of the state constitution. Id. at 549. It
seems to run contrary to logic that the DeJesus plurality would not rely on the Rules Enabling Act to
give the superior court judges the final power over evidence rules, but would rely on a case that uses a
statute delegating judicial powers to make their argument that the powers of the constitutional courts
were frozen in 1818.
185
355 A.2d 49 (Conn. 1974).
186
Id. at 62.
187
Id. at 62–65.
188
Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 173 (Conn. 1894) (emphasis added).
189
Id.
190
For example, a due process challenge or confrontation clause argument.
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controlling the rulemaking mechanism for the enforcement of that
substantive law. Such a procedural change does not alter the essential
characteristics of the supreme court.
As observed by Professor Richard Kay in his article about separation
of powers in Connecticut, Hamersley’s subsequent actions and judicial
decisions further suggest the limitations of his decision in Styles and
support the constitutional argument for legislative participation in
procedural judicial matters. Hamersley served on committees that drafted
and recommended court rules and practice acts to the General Assembly.
In his later judicial decisions, such as in Ockershausen v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad, the court held that when rules of court
conflict with a statute, the statute prevails.191
Furthermore, neither Walkinshaw nor Szarwak supports the argument
that making procedural rules of evidence is an essential characteristic of
the Connecticut Supreme Court. Instead, these cases stand for the
proposition that the essential characteristics of the jurisdiction of the
superior court cannot be impaired by a legislative act apportioning
excessive jurisdiction to the lower courts because doing so would alter the
essential character of the superior court.192 “Jurisdiction” is defined by
Black’s Law Dictionary as “a court’s power to decide a case or issue a
decree.”193 In DeJesus, the question presented was not about jurisdiction,
but a procedural matter. As mentioned earlier, this Note does not assert
that the supreme court can be divested of its power to hear cases where the
constitutionality of the rules of evidence contained within the Code is
questioned. Such a conclusion would violate the constitution, as an
essential characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme Court is to hear appeals
on matters of law. However, the conclusion in DeJesus, that an essential
characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme Court is to make procedural
rules of evidence, cannot be sustained by these two cases because they do
not discuss procedural characteristics inherent to the constitutional courts.
The author of the Walkinshaw opinion, Justice William M. Maltbie,
would not likely have been of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the
constitutional courts was completely frozen in 1818, or that the legislature
was not permitted to make procedural rules under the state constitution.
This can be seen in articles written by Maltbie in the Connecticut Bar
Journal. In his article entitled “The Courts and Constitutions of
Connecticut,” Maltbie described the constitution as containing “broad
definitions and limitations upon the agencies of government, leaving it
largely to the Legislature by its own acts to adapt their functions and
191
Ockershausen v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 42 A. 650, 651 (Conn. 1899); Kay, supra
note 127, at 15–18.
192
Szarwak, 355 A.2d at 63; Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, 32 A.2d 547, 553 (Conn. 1943).
193
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009).
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determine their powers in view of the needs of the particular time.”
In
another article, Maltbie asserted that the Connecticut Supreme Court was
given rulemaking power over the rules of the practice and procedure not by
the constitution, but by the statutes of 1821.195 If Maltbie thought that
procedural rule making was an essential characteristic of the judiciary,
frozen with the ratification of the Connecticut Constitution, he would have
found such an allocation of power unconstitutional.
This series of decisions illustrates the dangers of the slippery slope.
What started in Styles v. Tyler as an interpretation of article V as granting
general jurisdiction to the superior court over the trial of causes and
appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court in resolving errors of law or
errors of mixed fact and law, has culminated in DeJesus’s radical departure
from the text of the constitution. The holding in DeJesus, that procedural
evidentiary rule making is an essential and constitutionally prescribed
characteristic of the supreme court that cannot be shifted solely to the
superior court, is not supported by the case law cited by the plurality for
this proposition. Such an interpretation extends the powers of the
Connecticut Supreme Court beyond their constitutional scope.
Perhaps most interesting about the series of decisions upon which the
plurality’s constitutional argument rests is that each case cited addresses
the separation of powers between branches, but no case addressed the
question of a separation of powers within the judicial branch itself. As
Justice Katz said in her dissenting opinion in DeJesus, “This court has
considered constitutional challenges regarding separation of powers
concerns via legislative intrusion into the court’s authority to adopt rules of
practice, without ever suggesting that the procedure within the judicial
branch itself may be constitutionally suspect.”196
This Note concludes that, because evidentiary rule making is not an
essential characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme Court, the
constitutional issue in DeJesus is not the separation of procedural powers
within the judicial branch, but the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branch. As stated above, the text and history of the
Connecticut Constitution support the assertion that the legislature has the
authority to allocate rulemaking authority to the superior court under
Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14, or the Rules Enabling Act, so
allowing the judges of the superior court to adopt a binding code of
evidence.
The case law regarding the separation of powers as related to judicial
procedural rule making, however, has called into question the
194

William M. Maltbie, The Courts and Constitutions of Connecticut, 9 CONN. B.J. 269, 278

(1935).

195
196

William M. Maltbie, The Supreme Court of Errors, 26 CONN. B.J. 357, 370 (1952).
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 104 (Conn. 2008) (Katz, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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constitutionality of this statute.
In 1976, the Connecticut Legislature
revised section 51-14, likely as a response to the Clemente holding.198 The
revised language limited the rulemaking authority of the courts by stating
that they could only promulgate rules of practice and procedure in “courts
in which they have the constitutional authority to make rules.”199
Considering the lack of consensus on the constitutional authority of the
legislature to allocate procedural rule making, the addition of this language
neither clarified nor resolved this issue.
The constitutional questions surrounding the Rules Enabling Act
remain today. In February 2009, the House introduced a bill to amend
subsection (b) of the Rules Enabling Act to read as follows:
The Chief Justice shall report any rules adopted and
promulgated, or modified, superseded or suspended, by the
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges of the Appellate
Court or the Judges of the Superior Court pursuant to the
provisions of this section to the General Assembly for study
at the beginning of each regular session.200
The bill also proposes several changes to various judicial procedural
197
See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 730–31 (Conn. 1974) (holding that Connecticut General
Statutes section 54-86b impaired an essential function of the courts and, therefore, was an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers by the legislature); Adams v. Rubinow, 251 A.2d
49, 56 (Conn. 1968) (“[T]he General Assembly has no power to make rules of administration, practice
or procedure which are binding on either of the two constitutional courts and that any attempt on its
part to exercise such power is dependent for its efficacy, upon the acquiescence of the constitutional
court involved.”).
198
The amendment to Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 was part of a much larger bill
restructuring the Connecticut courts. H.B. 5605, 1976 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 1976). The
Joint Committee on Judicial Modernization, a coalition between the Connecticut Citizens for Judicial
Modernization and the Connecticut Bar Association was established in 1971—before Clemente—to
study the state of the judicial system and to draft statutory improvements. Specifically, the
Commission focused on the overlapping jurisdiction of the probate courts, the courts of common pleas,
and the superior court. FIRST REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION, H.
Reg. Sess., at 2–7 (Conn. 1972). The bill that followed, “An Act Transferring All Trial Jurisdiction to
the Superior Court,” exceeded five hundred pages and includes the revision to Connecticut General
Statutes section 51-14. H.B. 5605, Feb. Sess. (Conn. 1976). The legislative history is silent with
regard to the revision of section 51-14. The rulemaking authority of the judicial branch is referenced,
but not discussed in depth. An Act Transferring All Trial Jurisdiction to the Superior Court: Hearing
on H.B. 5605 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Reg. Sess. 258 (Conn. 1976) (statement of James
F. Bingham) (“The rule-making powers will remain in the courts and the judges shall establish by rule
parts and divisions of the said court as they determine necessary.”); see also CONNECTICUT CITIZENS
FOR JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION AND CONNECTICUT BAR ASSOCIATION, FIRST REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION 103 (1972) (“The subcommittee is dealing with matters
which fall primarily within the present existing rule-making power of the courts and which do not
require legislative change.”).
199
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14 (1975); An Act Transferring All Trial Jurisdiction to the Superior
Court, Pub. Act No. 76-436, 1976 Conn. Acts 1 (Reg. Sess.).
200
H.B. 6340, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009). This language was not included in the
Substitute House Bill. Substitute H.B. 6340, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009). The statute
currently reads, “The chief justice shall report any such rules to the general assembly for study at the
beginning of each regular session.” CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14(b) (2009).
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statutes. For example, the bill proposes to amend section 51-51k, which
addresses the role and responsibility of the judicial review council; section
51-51q, which addresses the reappointment process for judges; section 511b, which addresses the function of the court administrator; section 53a39a, regarding the public record when a defendant is sentenced to an
alternate to incarceration; and section 54-56d, which addresses the
procedure for determining competency of defendants.201
At the public hearing for House Bill 6340, Barbara Quinn, the Chief
Court Administrator, submitted testimony on behalf of the judicial branch.
In her testimony, Quinn stated that the judicial branch approves of all the
bills’ contents except for those relating to court rules. Specifically, Quinn
stated:
For the past thirty years, the Judicial Branch has been
providing copies of all of the rules changes made during the
preceding year to the General Assembly in order to promote
cooperation and avoid a constitutional confrontation. This
does not mean that the judiciary has acquiesced and ceded its
authority with regard to the adoption of procedural rules for
the courts. During that time, the Judiciary Committee has
never held a hearing on the rules submitted, as required by
the statute, nor has the Legislature ever declared a rule to be
void pursuant to this statute. If those events were to occur,
the Judicial Branch might very well raise the issue of this
statute’s constitutionality. If you decide that the Legislature
should have control over the procedural rules, I would submit
that a constitutional amendment is necessary.202
Why the judicial branch considers legislative involvement to be
constitutionally permissible in certain judicial procedural matters, but not
in others, remains unclear. Such inconsistency illustrates the need for
clarity in the law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEJESUS DECISION
The four-and-a-half-year effort, intended to provide an authoritative
statement of Connecticut evidence law, one on which parties, practitioners,
and judges could rely, has been defeated. In Tait’s Handbook of
Connecticut Evidence, Professor Colin Tait wrote:
Attorneys and judges at trial who rely on the Code may do so
at their peril. The net effect of [the DeJesus] holding is that
201

H.B. 6340, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009).
Rules Enabling Act: Hearing on H.B. 6340 Before the Judiciary Comm., 2009 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (statement of Barbara M. Quinn, Chief Court Adm’r).
202
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litigators are free to challenge on appeal any trial court ruling
relying on the Code of Evidence, even if the ruling is not
constitutional in nature.203
Now that these rules can be changed by the appellate courts, they are
not authoritative or binding. Since the Code itself will need to be changed
every time any appellate decision changes a Code provision, the Code will,
in a sense, always be “out-of-date.”204 Any common law changes will have
to be drafted, approved, and then added to the Code. As this is a timeconsuming process, there will inevitably be times when the Code does not
include all evidence rules, so those in need of assurance that a rule is what
it purports to be cannot depend on the Code. Also, parties cannot rely on a
rule from the Code when arguing on appeal because the appellate courts
can now change the rules of evidence as they see fit.
Also troubling about the DeJesus holding is the four-and-a-half-year
waste of legislative and judicial resources expended to develop the Code.
The lack of cooperation between the judicial branch and the legislative
branch caused this and will continue to do so until the debate is resolved.
For the sake of saving resources, the law must be predictable. To
accomplish this, the limits of the legislature’s powers in the judicial
context need be defined more precisely than the current law provides.
Judges, legislators, and private parties need to know where constitutional
authority ends and begins. In DeJesus, an arguably constitutional
allocation of power from the Rules Enabling Act authorized the superior
court to make this an authoritative code, but the supreme court did not
address this. The Rules Enabling Act directs the superior, appellate, and
supreme courts to adopt procedural rules when they have the constitutional
authority to do so.205 Following DeJesus, that constitutional authority is
unclear—a binding evidence code is now considered beyond the superior
court’s constitutional scope, and possibly the rules of practice and
procedure also.
This ambiguity has resulted in an unreliable code of evidence and
countless hours of taxpayer-funded work wasted. Reconciliation is needed
between these two branches over who has the power to make rules
regulating court procedure: the legislature and the courts, or the courts
alone. Otherwise, this waste of resources and time will continue, stalling
progress on more pressing substantive issues.
Since the Connecticut Legislature is not likely to cede its rulemaking
power, and the courts do not seem likely to recognize that rulemaking
authority, a more drastic approach seems necessary. A constitutional
203

TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
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CONN. GEN STAT. § 51-14 (2009).
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amendment may serve as the best means to resolve the difference of
opinion on the subject.206 Since this debate over procedural authority has
lasted for several years, the respective branches do not seem likely to
resolve this issue on their own. Accordingly, it is time to put the issue to
rest, and turn it over to the electors to decide. Currently, there is a pending
resolution to amend article V.207 The amendment proposes the language be
changed to read:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a
supreme court, an appellate court, a superior court, and such
lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time,
ordain and establish. The general assembly shall prescribe by
law the powers, procedures and jurisdiction of these courts.208
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the specific language
of a constitutional amendment, it seems the amendment should not wholly
exclude the judicial branch from the rulemaking process, as this proposal
does.
It has been argued that amending article V is not warranted because the
procedural rule making dispute does not rise to the level of extraordinary
circumstances required for amending the constitution. Both Wesley
Horton and Justice Zarella made this assertion in their testimony at the
public hearing on the proposed amendment. According to Horton,
“[U]nless there were some enormous crisis going on that you need to
change the balance of powers—and there’s no crisis out there; there’s no
major reason for this—you shouldn’t be putting up a constitutional
amendment.”209 Similarly, Justice Zarella asserted, “In my view, and in
the view of the branch, amending any constitution is an extraordinary act.
It should be done only as a last resort. The constitution should be amended
when a significant recurring problem has been identified and the only
solution is a constitutional amendment.”210 While this premise is accurate,
this Note illustrates that the ongoing conflict between the legislature and
the judiciary does indeed warrant such an amendment. This constitutional
dispute has resulted in wasted time and resources, as illustrated by the
206
But see Wesley W. Horton & Kenneth J. Bartschi, 2006 Connecticut Appellate Review, 81
CONN. B.J. 1, 13, 15–16 (2007) (concluding that reconsideration of the Clemente holding is the solution
to the uncertainty surrounding the separation of powers and judicial procedure).
207
S.J. Res. 46, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009).
208
Id. The current article V, section 1 reads, “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a
supreme court, an appellate court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall,
from time to time, ordain and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by
law.” CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1.
209
Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the State Concerning the
Procedures of the Courts: Hearing on S.J. Res. 46 Before the Judiciary Comm., Jan. Sess. 132 (Conn.
2009) (statement of Wesley Horton, Conn. Bar Association).
210
Id. at 137–38 (statement of Justice Peter T. Zarella).
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dismantling of the Evidence Code. If the issue were resolved, courts and
legislators could direct their work toward more important law making.
Furthermore, as stated by Senator McDonald, “I don’t necessarily agree
that the only time you entertain constitutional amendment questions is
when there’s an uproar about a particular subject. You can actually do it in
a non-volatile situation as well.”211
In the meantime, the legislature could enact the Evidence Code as a
statute. In doing so, the time and resources expended on making the Code
would not be futile because the legislature could essentially adopt the Code
as is, adding to it the rule from DeJesus.212 If the legislature does this, it
should also add other Connecticut statutory evidence laws to the Code.213
While sorting through the statutes will be a resource-consuming project, it
would result in an even better product than the initial Code. The concern
with this solution is that the Connecticut Supreme Court would find such
an act unconstitutional based on the holding in DeJesus, again illustrating
the problems caused by unpredictable law.
A legislative takeover of the Evidence Code has its disadvantages.
First, the same concerns that prompted the legislature to relinquish
authority over the Code to the judiciary in 1998 still exist today. As
discussed earlier, these concerns are that the Code should be responsive to
judicial concerns, isolated from politically motivated changes, and should
be easier to amend than it would be under legislative restraints.214 Second,
such a takeover will continue to widen the divide between courts and the
legislature instead of these two branches working cooperatively to solve
procedural issues. Additionally, there is the looming question of whether
the courts would recognize such a legislative code, or instead deem it
unconstitutional. The DeJesus plurality opinion215 and Justice Palmer’s
concurring opinion216 both quote State v. James for the proposition that the
legislature has enacted statutes governing evidence procedure which have
not been found to violate the separation of powers but have instead been
accepted by the courts. Additionally, the original intent of the judiciary
was for the Code to be a legislative compilation, as illustrated by Chief
Justice Ellen Peters’s 1984 biannual report asking the legislature to codify
evidence rules.217 There remains the possibility, however, that the courts
would not find such a legislative code of evidence constitutional. Since the
211

Id. at 133 (statement of Sen. Andrew J. McDonald, member, Judiciary Comm.).
The legislature could add this rule, along with any other new common law rules that may come
forth following DeJesus.
213
The legislature should also repeal all evidence statutes so as to eliminate any conflicts between
a statutory evidence code and any pre-existing statutory rules of evidence.
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See supra Part II.A.
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State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 72 n.31 (Conn. 2008).
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Id. at 85 n.7 (Palmer, J., concurring).
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DeJesus court held that control over evidence rule making is a
constitutionally prescribed function of the appellate courts, the court could
assert that, just as this function cannot be taken away by the superior court,
neither can it be taken away by the legislature. Also, the question of
whether a judicial rule of evidence trumps a statutory rule has yet to come
before Connecticut courts. As the court wrote in James, “We leave to
another time the question whether our constitutional authority to make
rules governing court ‘administration, practice or procedure’ extends also
to the creation of a code of evidence and the resolution of possible
conflicts between its provisions and legislative enactments affecting the
same matters.”218
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of condensing Connecticut’s common law evidence rules
into a code was to increase courtroom efficiency by eliminating the time
and resources wasted by judges and practitioners trying to decipher
common law rules. Unfortunately, the Evidence Code has been reduced to
an outdated restatement of evidence law, one that cannot be relied upon as
it does not include this latest common law rule and because the rules it
does contain can be altered by appellate courts as they please. The
Connecticut Supreme Court, unable to agree on one rationale to justify this
departure from the Code’s purpose, put forth three different ways of
reaching the same conclusion, illustrating the unstable foundation on which
this holding stands. This Note concludes that the constitutional argument
not only fails, but also sets a dangerous precedent. To limit the jurisdiction
of the two constitutional courts to not only their essential functions, but
also the non-essential functions of their eighteenth and nineteenth century
predecessors, freezes for eternity a judiciary that was intended to grow and
develop over time. This has resulted in a split judiciary that cannot agree
on an evidence code, the success of which would simplify procedure so
that courts can focus on substantive issues and not squander their time on
procedural disputes. The result of this is a split judiciary that cannot agree
on something like an evidence code, the success of which would have
simplified procedure so that courtrooms could focus on substantive issues
instead of squandering time on procedural disputes.

218
State v. James, 560 A.2d 426, 431 (Conn. 1989) (quoting Adams v. Rubinow, 251 A.2d 49, 56
(Conn. 1968)).

